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In this article we draw on John Dewey’s (1910) classic book How We Think to reflect on the absence of a culture of ‘critical 
thinking’ and/or ‘reflective thinking’ at Morgenster Teachers’ College. ‘Critical thinking’ and/or ‘reflective thinking’ are central to 
John Dewey (1916, 1910) and Paulo Freire’s (2005, 1995) teachings. But they are also embedded in the dialogues of Plato, for 
instance, The Republic, Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, and Protagoras, to mention a few. But data from focus group interviews 
conducted with final year students at Morgenster Teachers’ College shows that pedagogical practices at the college are 
monologic or one-dimensional, which is not supportive of ‘critical thinking’ and/or ‘reflective thinking’. Our contention in this 
article is that in teaching and learning it is essential for the students to be equipped with the skills to understand the world and 
what is in it. For such understanding to occur teachers should engage the students in philosophical inquiry and critical dialogue. 
Philosophical inquiry is most effective when it takes the form of dialogue between peers. But as Freire (1995) points out, true 
dialogue cannot exist unless the dialoguers engage in critical thinking. We recognise that Morgenster Teachers’ College is an 
important institution with a mandate to produce teachers. It is therefore incumbent that the college shifts from monologic 
pedagogies, to pedagogiies that are anchored in philosophical inquiry, critical dialogue, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘reflective thinking’, 
which engender an understanding of the world and what is in it. 
 





In one of our articles we took issue with the pedagogical principles and practices at Morgenster Teachers’ College 
(MTC)1, a private teachers’ college of the Reformed Church in Zimbabwe (RCZ) in Masvingo, a town in south-eastern 
Zimbabwe. We found the college’s pedagogical principles and practices to be monologic or one-dimensional. We worried 
that monologic pedagogy regards ‘knowledge’ as fixed bodies of facts that are out there and that must be transferred into 
the students’ minds. We expressed concern that monologic pedagogy treats student teacher’s as tabula rasa, a Latin 
phrase or expression for ‘clean slates’, ‘empty vessels’, or ‘receptacles’ that must be filled with the fixed bodies of facts, 
which are presumed to constitute ‘worthwhile knowledge’. The presumption that fixed bodies of facts constitute 
‘worthwhile knowledge’ is highly debatable (Freire, 1996, 2005; West, 2004; Gravett, 2001; Letseka, 1995; Dewey, 1910).  
We surmised that monologic pedagogy has serious implications for teaching and learning and for theory and 
practice. On the one hand it is analogous to ‘the banking concept of education’, which Brazilian philosopher of education 
Paulo Freire cogently delineates in his celebrated book Pedagogy of the Oppressed. On the other hand monologic 
pedagogy is potentially indoctrinatory (Garrison, 1986; Macmillan, 1983; Snook, 1972a, 1972b, 1970). In the 1970s New 
Zealand philosopher of education Ivan Snook (1972a, p.3) argued that “once indoctrination is clearly understood, it will be 
obvious that it is reprehensible, although there will be disagreement as to why it is”. While Snook (1970, p.56) was 
convinced that “indoctrination is a pejorative term”, he was cautious that “far from it being the case that ‘teaching’ 
excludes ‘indoctrination’, there is a necessary or conceptual relationship between them” (Snook, 1972a, p.47). We 
worried that pedagogical practices at Morgenster are incapable of developing teachers that are initiated in the Socratic 
tradition of critical self-examination and critical dialogue, that is, teachers with critical and reflective thinking dispositions.  
                                                            
1 Henceforth this shall be referred to as Morgenster. 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
Published by MCSER-CEMAS-Sapienza University of Rome      




  52 
In this article, we draw lessons on John Dewey’s (1910) classic book How We Think, to reflect on the philosophical 
nuances of the notions of ‘critical thinking’ and/or ‘reflective thinking’, and to speculate on how a deeper understanding of 
these notions can potentially impact teaching and learning environments where generally ‘critical thinking’ is not 
encouraged. It is our view that Dewey’s book provides useful building blocks for theorising the notions of ‘critical thinking’ 
and/or ‘reflective thinking’, and that it is an invaluable resource for assisting initial teacher development educators in 
theorising their notions of ‘critical thinking’ and/or ‘reflective thinking’. As Karl Popper (2002, pp.37-8) notes in his 
acclaimed book The Logic of Scientific Discovery, “theories are nets cast to catch what we call ‘the world’: to rationalise, 
to explain, and to master it. We endeavour to make the mesh ever finer and finer”.  
We proceed as follows. We start by sketching Dewey’s conceptualisation of ‘thinking’, which he does wonderfully in 
chapter one of How We Think, ‘What is thought?”. We follow this with a description and analysis of the data from focused 
group interviews that were conducted during the study on obstacles to critical thinking among third [final] year student 
teachers at Morgenster. The data suggests that educators at Morgenster are champions of monologic pedagogy. We 
then delineate probable causes to which the obstacles to ‘critical’ and/or ‘reflective’ thinking might be attributed. In the 
penultimate section of the article we comment on the pertinence of Dewey’s teachings on ‘thinking’. Our aim is to 
ascertain the implications for teaching and learning in environments such as Morgenster where ‘critical thinking’ and/or 
‘reflective thinking’ are not encouraged. Our view is that Dewey’s book remains pertinent to teaching and learning today 
as it was when it was first published in 1910. In the final section with provide some concluding remarks. 
 
2. John Dewey’s conception of ‘thinking’ 
 
In How We Think John Dewey (1910) writes that so profuse and varied is our use of ‘thinking’ and ‘thought’ that it is not 
easy to define just what we mean by them. His intension in chapter one is ‘to find a single consistent meaning’. It is 
worthwhile noting that Dewey’s (1916, p.158) passions for ‘thinking’ and for the importance of the development of thinking 
skills is schools can again be found in Democracy and Education where he writes: “no one doubts, theoretically, the 
importance of fostering in school good habits of thinking”. Dewey (1916, p.159) further argues that “thinking is the method 
of intelligent learning, of learning that employs and rewards mind”. Thus “thinking originates in situations where the 
course of thinking is an actual part of the course of events and is designed to influence the result….The object of thinking 
is to help reach a conclusion, to project a possible termination on the basis of what is already given” (Dewey, 1916, 
p.154). And “since the situation in which thinking occurs is a doubtful one, thinking is a process of inquiry, of looking into 
things, of investigating”. For Dewey then, “all thinking is research, and all research is native, original, with him who carries 
it on, even if everybody else in the world already is sure of what he is still looking for”. 
In “How we Think”, Dewey (1910, p.1) argues that in the first place thought can be used loosely to refer to anything 
that ‘comes to mind’ or that ‘goes through our heads’. In this regard “to think of a thing is just to be conscious of it in any 
way whatsoever”. In this loose sense thinking signifies everything that is ‘in our heads’ or that ‘goes through our minds’.  
Ennis (1964, p.599) calls this ‘poor critical thinking’. Our view is that our responsibility as educators is to shun inclinations 
to promote ‘poor critical thinking’ among our students, but instead to strive towards ‘thinking’ in its critical, more reflective 
sense, or what Ennis calls ‘good critical thinking’. Schafersman (1991, p.3) argues that critical thinking is critical inquiry. 
To that end critical thinkers investigate problems, ask questions, pose new answers that challenge the status quo, 
discover new information that can be used for good or ill, question authorities and traditional beliefs, challenge received 
dogmas and doctrines, and often end up possessing a power in society greater than their numbers. In another publication 
Schafersman (1997, p.4) posits that “the only way to escape both deception by others and the far more common trait of 
self-deception is to repeatedly and rigorously examine your basis for holding your beliefs. You must question the truth 
and reliability of both the knowledge claims of others and the knowledge you already possess”. 
For Dewey (1910, p.4), “thought denotes belief resting upon some basis, that is, real or supposed knowledge going 
beyond what is directly present. It is marked by acceptance or rejection of something as reasonably probable or 
improbable”. Regarding ‘reflection’ Dewey (1910, p.8) is unequivocal that “reflection thus implies that something is 
believed in (or disbelieved in), not on its own direct account, but through something else which stands as witness, 
evidence, proof, voucher, warrant; that is, as ground of belief”. In Democracy and Education Dewey (1916, p.150) 
contends that ‘thought’ or ‘reflection’ “is the discernment of the relation between what we try to do and what happens in 
consequence. No experience having a meaning is possible without some element of thought”. Dewey (1910, p.6) defines 
‘reflective thought’ as “active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light 
of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends”. For Dewey (1910, p.57), “reflection is turning 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
Published by MCSER-CEMAS-Sapienza University of Rome      




  53 
a topic over in various aspects and in various lights so that nothing significant about it shall be overlooked - almost as one 
might turn a stone over  to see what its hidden side is like or what is covered by it”. Dewey argues that in speaking of 
reflection, “we naturally use the words weigh, ponder, deliberate - terms implying a certain delicate and scrupulous 
balancing of things against one another. Closely related names are scrutiny, examination, consideration, inspection - 
terms which imply close and careful vision”. As shall become clear later when we broach into pedagogical principles and 
practices at Morgenster the above-mentioned discourse seems alien.  We might add, it also seems like taboo. 
 Dewey (1910, p.10) picks out sub-processes which are involved in every reflective operation. These are: (a) a 
state of perplexity, hesitation, doubt; and (b) an act of search or investigation directed toward bringing to light further facts 
which serve to corroborate or to nullify the suggested belief. Perplexity forces us to carefully scrutinise what is before us; 
to look for evidence that will support belief in favour of either of the roads. For Dewey (1910, p.11), “thinking begins in 
what may fairly enough be called a forked-road situation, a situation which is ambiguous, which presents a dilemma, 
which proposes alternatives”. He contends that “the origin of thinking is some perplexity, confusion, or doubt. Thinking is 
not a case of spontaneous combustion; it does not occur just on ‘general principles’. There is something specific which 
occasions and evokes it” (Dewey, 1910, p.12). Perplexity, confusion, or doubt thus necessitates an act of search or 
investigation. And Dewey reminds us that “the next step is suggestion of some way out - the formation of some tentative 
plan or project, the entertaining of some theory which will account for the peculiarities in question, the consideration of 
some solution for the problem”. Lest we forget, Grant & Zeichner (1984, p.104) remind us that “much of what Dewey had 
to say on this matter was directed specifically at teachers and prospective teachers, and his remarks remain very relevant 
for those in the process of becoming teachers”.  
A question that might arise at this stage is: how pertinent are Dewey’s teachings on ‘thinking’ and/or ‘reflective 
thinking’ to Morgenster? Our answer to that question is that Morgenster is a college whose core activity is initial teacher 
development. And if Dewey’s teaching is directed at teachers and prospective teachers as Grant & Zeichner (1984) 
argue, then the pertinence of his work to Morgenster cannot be overemphasised. In the next section we provide a brief 
background to the study conducted at Morgenster. We describe the sample of the students that comprised respondents 
during the focused group interview sessions, and we sketch some of their verbatim responses. What begins to emerge 
from the data is that the pedagogical principles and practices at Morgenster are incompatible with Freire’s (1996) notion 
of education as the practice of freedom, dialogics and dialogue; Socrates’ notion of critical self-examination or fearless 
speech - parrhesia (West, 2004), as well as Dewey’s (1910) notion of ‘reflective thinking’ sketched above.  We now briefly 
sketch  the methodology we used to collect the data. 
 




3.1.1 Focused group interviews 
 
In July 2011 one of the authors conducted focused group interviews of all final [third] year student teachers at 
Morgenster. We were convinced that focused group interviews would drill deeper into, and bring out the 
phenomenological hermeneutical lived experiences of the students (Gonzales, 2006; Lindseth & Norberg, 2004; Eger, 
1993a, 1993b), as well as permit us to draw on critical theory to probe the students experiences further (Nuyen, 1995; 
Held, 1990; Geuss, 1981). Martin Eger (1993a) argues that in educational practice a hermeneutic approach has to be 
advocated mainly to foster ‘critical thinking’. He posits that by questioning the putative neutrality of reading a text, 
hermeneutics supports constructivist theories of knowledge and communication. By criticising over-dependence on formal 
methods, it highlights the linguistic component of the sciences - their shared, social elements. And by emphasising 
history, tradition, cultural perspectives, and by placing meaning at the centre of inquiry, hermeneutics aims to shore up in 
all scholarly activity an apparently declining human dimension (Eger, 1993a, p.1). In another publication Eger (1993b, 
p.304) asserts that as self-conscious interpretation hermeneutics becomes relevant in that “for each of the viewpoints 
selected, in each specific context, an interpretation of the object within that context is called for”. Our view is that 
hermeneutics fosters philosophical dialogues reminiscent of those found in Plato’s dialogues such as The Republic, 
Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, and Protagoras to mention a few. Gonzales (2006, p.313) contends that hermeneutics is 
“fundamentally and inescapably dialectical”. Krabbe (2000, p.205) defines dialectic as “the practice and theory of 
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conversations”. He elaborates: “the primary purpose of most dialectic practices is not to convince or to persuade, but to 
attain at a truth of some sort by inquiry” (Krabbe. 2000, p.208).  
Phenomenology aims to understand and interpret the meaning that subjects give to their everyday lives. Finlay 
(2009, p.6) notes that phenomenological researchers generally agree that their central concern is to return to embodied, 
experiential meanings.  Phenomenological researchers aim for fresh, complex, rich descriptions of a phenomenon as it is 
concretely lived. In this regard phenomenology has been described as a low-hovering, in-dwelling, meditative philosophy 
that glories in the concreteness of person-world relations and accords lived experience, with all its indeterminacy and 
ambiguity, primacy over the known (Wertz, 2005, p.175). Indeed Bradbury-Jones., Sambrook., & Irvine (2009) argue that 
focus groups are congruent with phenomenological research and propose that group interviews in phenomenology are 
beneficial because they stimulate discussion and open up new perspectives. 
Combining phenomenology and hermeneutics, as in phenomenological hermeneutical method for researching 
lived experience broadens and enhances the scope of focused group interviews. Lindseth., & Norberg (2004, p.151) 
argue that phenomenological hermeneutical investigations are about the meaning of lived experience. While they can be 
used to affect meaning of lived experience as understood by the interpreter, they caution that it is not only the interpreter 
that interprets the text. But that the text also interprets the interpreter. Thus the aim of phenomenological hermeneutical 
method is to disclose truths about the essential meaning of being in the life world. Researchers should not expect to find 
a single fundamental truth because the whole truth can never be fully understood. Instead, through a phenomenological 
hermeneutical journey researchers should search for possible meanings in a continuous process. It is our conviction that 
by engaging with small groups of students in focused group interviews a phenomenological hermeneutical method helped 
us to “search for possible meanings in a continuous process”.  
‘Critical theory’ has its origins in the Frankfurt School where it is associated with the following first generation 
theoreticians of the school: Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Lewenthal, Frederick Pollock, and 
Eric Fromm. Jürgen Habermas is regarded as a second generation member of the Frankfurt School who is credited for 
recasting the notion of critical theory in his recent work in philosophy and sociology” (Held, 1990, p.15). Held (1990, 
p.183) argues that ‘critical theory’s’ “method of procedure is immanent criticism, which confronts existence in its historical 
context, with the claims of its conceptual principles, in order to criticise the relation between the two and thus transcend 
them. For Geuss (1981, p. 2), ‘critical theory’ has always been portrayed as “a reflective theory which gives agents a kind 
of knowledge inherently productive of enlightenment and emancipation”. 
 
3.1.2 The interviews 
 
The field interviewer interviewed three groups of between six and seven students per group. The interviews lasted 
between 45 minutes to one hour. The interview process focused on seven key issues: perceptions of the influence of 
religion on critical thinking dispositions; perceptions of negative self concept with respect to critical thinking dispositions; 
the influence of monologic pedagogy and its implications for the development of critical thinking dispositions; lack of 
opportunities for experiential time on critical thinking dispositions; the influence of a closed political system on the 
development of critical thinking dispositions; the influence of gerontocratic orientations on critical thinking dispositions, 
and the influence of femininity orientations on critical thinking dispositions.  
The respondents were asked for their views on philosophy of education, and on their performances in philosophy 
of education assignments. If they did not do well they were asked to reflect on what might have contributed to their poor 
performance. In the second stage the respondents were asked to share views and opinions on the presentation of 
lectures in philosophy of education and to comment on how it might have impacted on their attitudes, either negatively or 
positively, towards philosophy of education. Given that the principal object of philosophy of education is the disciplined 
analysis, criticism and construction of arguments, the respondents were asked for their views on whether education 
should be a means for preparing individuals to play a critical role in social and political change. The primary issues about 
which the respondents were asked to express their views entailed perceptions on the influence of religion on critical 
thinking dispositions; the conditions in the college and whether they might be attributed to negative self concept with 
respect to critical thinking dispositions; the influence of monologic pedagogy and how it might impact on the development 
of critical thinking dispositions; absence of opportunities for experiential [research and seminars] time on critical thinking 
dispositions; the influence of gerontocratic orientations; the influence of a politically closed system, and the influence of 
femininity orientations. In closing, the respondents were asked for their views on factors they might attribute to stifling the 
development of their critical thinking dispositions. 
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The interviews were audio-taped, transcribed, and described using the respondents’ verbatim responses. Most 
qualitative researchers recognise that interviews should be recorded and transcribed in order to document transparency 
and to facilitate analysis and review of data after the interviews have taken place (Brod., Tesler., & Christensen, 2009). 
Kidd & Parshall (2000, p.298) argue that audiotape is often easier for a transcriptionist to work with than videotape. Of 
crucial importance though, audio-taping helps researchers remedy common, everyday memory problem (Vemuri., 
Schmandt., Bender., Tellex., & Lassey, 2004). Vemuri et al (2004, p.401) argue that while retrieving any information that 
triggers the memory of the event is sufficient, finding the exact information is necessary, which is why audio-taping is so 
important to qualitative researchers. 
 
3.1.3 Consideration of the code of research ethics 
 
Given that the study was conducted under the auspices of the University of South Africa (UNISA)’s Research Directorate 
the researchers were bound to comply with the university’s code of research ethics as outlined in UNISA Policy on 
Research Ethics (2007). The policy states that “participants are autonomous agents who have a right to choose whether 
or not to be part of the research”. Furthermore: “researchers should not infringe the autonomy of participants by resorting 
to coercion, undue influence or the promise of unrealistic benefits” (UNISA, 2007, p.11), because “autonomy requires that 
individuals’ participation should be freely given, specific and based on informed consent” (UNISA, 2007, p.10). We 
developed an informed consent form explaining in detail the university’s code of research ethics which was read out to 
the respondents before the interviews started so that there was common understanding on the rules of engagement. 
Upon ensuring that the respondents fully understood what they were consenting to, they were then requested to sign the 
voluntary consent form. The policy states that “measures to ensure privacy, anonymity and confidentiality of participants, 
as well as any risk of breach of confidentiality and anonymity should be explained. If data and identity provided by 
participants in group discussions cannot be kept anonymous and confidential, this should also be disclosed” (UNISA, 
2007, p.13). We recognised very early that by their very nature focus group interviews cannot guarantee confidentiality 
and non-disclosure of the information. To that end the respondents were asked to treat the informed consent form as 
proxy of non-disclosure agreement that bound them to the ethical principles of confidentiality and nondisclosure of any 
information regarding the interviews. Concomitantly the interviewer assured the respondents that we would not disclose 
their identities during compilation of the study’s preliminary report as well as during dissemination of the study’s findings. 
Instead non-traceable pseudonyms such as ‘respondent 1’, ‘respondent 2’, or ‘respondents’ would be used. 
 
4. Brief look at some of the findings 
  
4.1 On perceptions of the influence of religion on critical thinking dispositions 
 
One respondent told the interviewer: 
 
“Try critical discussion on religious issues here at Morgenster College and you’ll get deferred”. 
 
It became clear from group sessions that an element of coercion existed at the college for students to conform to certain 
religious doctrines. And from the above response it could be gleaned that deviation from the norm would have serious 
consequences. We argue that to compel students to conform to fixed and inflexible rules is tantamount to indoctrination 
(Garrison, 1986; Macmillan, 1983; Snook, 1972a, 1972b, 1970). As Snook (1970, p.70) puts it, “the essence of 
indoctrination lies in the method. Its evil lies in the intention”. He further argues that “to the degree that the learner 
becomes unfit to consider the matter on its merit, indoctrination has occurred. To the extent that a person takes steps to 
bring this about, indoctrination is morally wrong”. 
 
4.2 On negative self concept with respect to critical thinking dispositions  
 
In response to this category some of the respondents showed evidence of negative self-concept with regard to their 
capacity to freely comment on issues that are in the public domain. For instance, some students doubted their capacity to 
comment on, or to give authoritative opinions on ideas of renowned African leaders. For instance, one respondent stated 
her views as follows: 
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“I don’t think I will ever become a philosopher – I don’t have the intelligence”. 
 
“Look at us, just ‘O’ Level school leavers”. 
 
4.3 On the influence of monologic pedagogy and its implications for the development of critical thinking dispositions 
 
The category elicited the following responses:  
 
“Some lecturers just come and read notes to us”. 
 
“Sometimes you feel that you should reproduce what the ‘fundis’ give to you”. 
 
These responses are reminiscent of the ‘banking concept of education’ that Paulo Freire succinctly articulates in 
his acclaimed book Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Freire (1996, p.53) argues that in the ‘banking concept’ education 
becomes “an act of depositing, in which the students are depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of 
communicating, the teacher issues communiqués and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorise, 
and repeat”. According to this logic “knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable 
upon those whom they consider to know nothing. Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others, a characteristic of the 
ideology of oppression, negates education and knowledge as processes of inquiry” (Freire, 1972, p.53). But as Letseka 
(1995, p.295) cautions, the “so-called learning where the flow of information is one-dimensional, that is, where one 
element or subsystem plays a major or dominant role in the operation of the system as a whole, cannot, logically 
speaking, be called education. Within philosophy of education discourse such an ‘interaction’ qualifies as indoctrination”. 
 
4.4 On the absence of opportunities for experiential time on critical thinking dispositions 
 
In response to this category one respondent lamented that: 
“Our timetable is packed more than the primary school timetable”. 
 
Other respondents informed the interviewer: 
 
“We hand in assignments when they are still hot [we work on the assignments in the night when the due date for 
submission is the next day]”. 
 
“There is no time to digest what you are told”. 
 
“We have no time to think about the notes given to us”. 
 
“In other areas we reproduce the notes due to lack of time 
 
The question we ask is, is ‘reproducing the notes’ a manifestation of learning? Our answer is an unequivocal ‘No’. As 
Paulo Freire (2005, p.40) points out, “to study is to uncover; it is to gain a more exact comprehension of an object; it is to 
realise its relationship to other objects”. To that end teaching cannot be a “mechanical transference from which results 
machinelike memorisation”. Moreover, “critical study correlates with teaching that is equally critical, which necessarily 
demands a critical way of comprehending and of realising the reading of the word and that of the world, the reading of 
text and of context”. 
 
4.5 On the influence of a closed political system on the development of critical thinking dispositions 
 
This category elicited the following responses:  
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“Follow what you are told and have peace – be critical and philosophical and get into pieces”. 
 
Another respondent gave an impression of an individual living in a highly censored political environment, and who 
has, necessarily resigned to self-censoring herself: 
 
“About issues concerning politics, I am not prepared to comment” 
 
When asked about their reluctance to get involved in political issues one respondent made the following 
comments: 
 
“I am afraid you may not finish the course”. 
“Why would one dice with trouble”. 
 
It is Letseka’s (1995, p.289) contention that “closed systems would be those that cannot import energy”. In social 
theory and political practice systems that qualify as ‘closed’ are dictatorial, military, totalitarian, autocratic, tyrannical and 
other single-handed forms of government. It is our view that the college is a closed system as a result of the political 
environment in which it exists, and which it is incapable of changing. 
 
4.6 On the influence of gerontocratic orientations on critical thinking dispositions. 
 
We pointed out in our description of the sample above that 12 of the respondents or 66 per cent came from rural areas 
while 8 or 34 per cent came from urban areas. We suggested that this was probably an important indicator that should 
shed light on the influence of gerontocracy on critical thinking dispositions. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
gerontocracy as ‘government by a council of elders’/ ‘a governing body consisting of old people’/ ‘a state or government in 
which old people rule’. We do not presume there is anything fundamentally wrong with gerontocracy. In fact some 
western theorists have written about gerontocracy as a useful unit of socio-political and cultural analysis in oral cultures. 
For instance, Canadian philosopher of education Kieran Egan (1992, p.641) observes that in oral cultures elders are of 
such considerable socio-political and cultural importance in that they are deemed “qualified to speak authoritatively on 
public matters and to mediate on socio-political and cultural issues because they articulate the meaning of life”. Similarly 
Yale University political scientist Robert Dahl (1998, p.10) notes that tribal elders “see themselves as about equal in being 
well qualified to have a say in governing the group”, while Nelson Mandela (1995, p.24) argues that the elders are “wise 
men who retained the knowledge of tribal history and custom in their heads and whose opinions carried great weight”. 
The issue of major contestation with gerontocracy is that invariably the ‘elders’ are males. Feminist critics have charged 
that most oral cultures are patriarchal and notorious for excluding women from public decision-making structures and 
forums. American feminist political philosopher Susan Moller Okin (1999) did not mince her words in asserting that most 
of the world’s traditions and cultures “are quite distinctly patriarchal”. 
 Upon probing the respondents further on the possible influence of gerontocracy on critical thinking dispositions the 
probes yielded the following responses:   
  
“Whatever elders say is indisputable”. 
 
One respondent expressed total frustration on the issue of ‘whose knowledge counts and why’? She lamented: 
 
“You get current information on the internet but you are told that experience counts most”. 
 
“Old people say, ‘Takabva nako kumhunga hakuna ipwa’ [I have experienced a lot in this area so get it from me’]. 
 
In a seemingly inevitable surrender to the elders’ monopoly of ‘knowledge’ and other ‘ways of knowing’ one 
respondent informed the interviewer: 
 
“Keep quiet, old people do not make mistakes”. 
“Philosophise with age-mates, but not among the elders”. 
 
E-ISSN 2281-4612 
ISSN 2281-3993        
Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies
Published by MCSER-CEMAS-Sapienza University of Rome      




  58 
4.7 On the Influence of femininity orientations on critical thinking dispositions. 
 
Some female respondents shared their experiences of induction and socialisation by the elderly women into a wide 
spectrum of gendered roles and societal expectations, all of which help reinforce the ‘distinctly patriarchal’ nature of most 
cultures to which Okin (1999) referred above. For instance: 
 
“When one gets married, one’s aunts advise her not to be argumentative in the home”.   
 
“At ‘kitchen parties’ older women advise us not to be critical in the home”. 
 
Similarly critical dialogue which we identified as central to the work of Paulo Freire (2005, 1996) above can at best 
be described as taboo among some of the married female respondents: 
 
“A good woman is one who obeys”. 
“In-laws do not like critical women”. 
“Your critiquing should end at college, not in the home”. 
“Your husband would think you are big headed because you have been to college”. 
 
One of the male respondents endorsed this patriarchal mindset when he declared: 
 
“I would not like to marry a woman who would engage me in debates”. 
 
5. The pertinence of Dewey’s teachings on ‘thinking’ in contemporary settings  
 
It should be clear by now that our starting point is that thinking, whether it is ‘critical’ and/or ‘reflective’ thinking, is sine qua 
non to teaching and learning. Grant & Zeichner (1984, p.104) argue that in any social setting, and the school is no 
exception, there exists’ a taken-for-granted definition of everyday reality in which problems, goals, and the means for their 
solution become defined in particular ways. They contend that as long as everyday life continues without interruption, this 
reality is perceived to be unproblematic. Teachers who are unreflective about their work uncritically accept this everyday 
reality in schools and concentrate their efforts on finding the most effective and efficient means to achieve ends and to 
solve problems that have largely been defined for them by others. It is our view that in How We Think Dewey is making a 
case for teachers and prospective teachers to be ‘critical’ and/or ‘reflective’ thinkers. The need for ‘critical’ and/or 
‘reflective’ thinking is fairly easy to fathom. As Schafersman (1997, p.2) points out, “critical thinking is perhaps the most 
important skill a student can learn in school and college, since if you master its skills, you know how to think successfully 
and reach reliable conclusions, and such ability will prove valuable in any human endeavour, including the humanities, 
social sciences, commerce, law, journalism, and government, as well as in scholarly and scientific pursuits”. The other 
important consideration is that generally ‘critical’ and/or ‘reflective’ thinkers are open-minded. Open-mindedness as used 
here “refers to an active desire to listen to more sides than one, to give full attention to alternative possibilities, and to 
recognise the possibility of error even in the beliefs that are clearest to us” (Grant & Zeichner, 1984, p.105). Thus to the 
open-minded, critical and/or reflective education practitioners, what appears on the surface to be “everyday reality is only 
one of many possible alternatives”. As for Dewey (1910, p.58), no argument is needed to point out that “the intellectual 
[as distinct from the moral] end of education is the formation of careful, alert, and thorough habits of thinking”.  
Knight & Collins (2010) make a compelling case for “the power of philosophical inquiry”, which we think is deeply 
embedded in Dewey’s articulation of ‘critical thinking’ and/or ‘reflective thinking’ as sketched above. Knight & Collins 
(2010, p.309) define philosophical inquiry as “the questioning of underlying assumptions, assumptions whose truth or 
falsity cannot be decided by appeal to experiment and observation”.  They argue that philosophical inquiry “is directed at 
issues whose resolution depends less on data gathering than on the formulation of arguments”. It is their contention that if 
students are to develop an understanding of the world and what is in it, then as teachers we must engage them in 
philosophical inquiry. The reason for this is that philosophical inquiry leads to understanding, which they conceive of as 
“an active process, involving the construction of reasons and meanings” (Knight & Collins, 2010, p.307). Knight & Collins 
(2010, p.310) argue that “the more children engage in philosophical inquiry, the more likely it is that they will come to care 
for truth”. Our view is that the same argument applies to mature adult learners like those at Morgenster. Citing Lipman 
(1985), Knight & Collins (2010, p.315) argue that philosophical inquiry is most effective when it takes the form of dialogue 
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between peers. By dialogue they mean “talking which is disciplined by the rules of logic”. They contend that “the most 
direct link to thinking is talking - students can voice their thoughts effectively even if they have trouble doing so in writing”. 
Notice the similarity here with Paulo Freier’s emphasis on dialogue. As Freire (1996, p.73) puts it, “true dialogue cannot 
exist unless the dialoguers engage in critical thinking - thinking which discerns an indivisible solidarity between the world 
and the people and admits of no dichotomy between them- thinking which perceives reality as process, as transformation, 
rather than as a static entity - thinking which does not separate itself from action, but constantly immerses itself in 
temporality without fear of the risks involved”. 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
What we have tried to do in this article is to draw lessons from John Dewey’s (1910) teachings on ‘thinking’ in his classic 
book How We Think, with a view to reflecting on the implications of the absence of a culture for ‘critical thinking’ and/or 
‘reflective thinking’ at Morgenster. ‘Critical thinking’ and/or ‘reflective thinking’ are central to the teachings of both Dewey 
(1916, 1910) and Freire (2005, 1995). They can also be found in the many dialogues of Plato such as The Republic, 
Meno, Euthyphro, Apology, and Protagoras, to mention a few. Yet as the data from focus group interviews with final year 
teacher education students at Morgenster shows, the pedagogical principles and practices at the college are not 
supportive of ‘critical thinking’ and/or ‘reflective thinking’. This is an unfortunate situation given that in the educative 
process, that is, in teaching and learning, it is essential that teachers equip the students with the skills to understand the 
world and what is in it. Understanding here is taken to mean “an active process, involving the construction of reasons and 
meanings”. In order for understanding to occur teachers must engage the students in critical dialogue and philosophical 
inquiry. Philosophical inquiry is most effective when it takes the form of dialogue between peers. By dialogue we mean 
“talking which is disciplined by the rules of logic”. We showed that for Freire (1995), “true dialogue cannot exist unless the 
dialoguers engage in critical thinking”. In closing we want to acknowledge that Morgenster is an important higher 
education institution that is mandated to produce teachers. Which is why it is of utmost importance that the college shifts 
from monologic pedagogies to pedagogical approaches that are grounded in ‘philosophical inquiry’, ‘critical dialogue’, 
‘critical thinking’ and ‘reflective thinking’. That is, pedagogical approaches that engender a deeper understanding of the 
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